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GABRIEL S. MENDLOW

The Moral Ambiguity of Public Prosecution
abstract. Classic crimes like the� and assault are in the ﬁrst instance wrongs against indi-

viduals, not against the state or the polity that it represents. Yet our legal system denies crime
victims the right to initiate or intervene in the criminal process, relegating them to the roles of
witness or bystander—even as the system treats prosecution as an institutional analog of the interpersonal processes of moral blame and accountability, which give pride of place to those most
directly wronged. Public prosecution reigns supreme, with the state claiming primary and exclusive moral standing to call oﬀenders to account for their wrongs. Although likely justiﬁed all
things considered, this legal arrangement upends the structures of accountability familiar from
ordinary life, where the victims of wrongdoing enjoy moral standing of a caliber greater than
that of most if not all third parties. By inverting these structures of accountability, the state that
acts as exclusive public prosecutor exceeds its moral standing and incurs a debt to the crime victim, who retains a persisting moral complaint, even against a state that justiﬁably monopolizes
the prosecution function. The victim’s persisting moral complaint is diﬀerent from the wellknown grievance that a criminal legal system that marginalizes or excludes crime victims risks
injuring their dignity and impairing their prospects for vindication and reconciliation. If the state
showed crime victims greater solicitude and accommodated their interests and considered preferences more deliberately, the criminal process might dignify victims and enhance their wellbeing. But the state still would exceed its moral standing if it accommodated the victim as a matter
of benevolent grace, rather than in recognition of the victim’s moral prerogative.
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The victim’s prerogative to call a wrongdoer to account is a widely acknowledged but little
examined aspect of relational morality. This Essay argues that the victim’s prerogative shares a
foundation with other more theoretically familiar norms of partiality, self-preference, and exclusion, all of which reﬂect our status as individual persons, rather than as vectors for the promotion of impartial value. Grounded in the victim’s status as an individual human person, the victim’s moral prerogative continues to exert normative force even when justiﬁably supplanted by
the myriad considerations of equity and eﬃcacy that favor public prosecution on the whole. The
moral interests undergirding the victim’s prerogative may survive speciﬁcally in the form of reasons for us to consider ceding the crime victim a degree of procedural control, much the way
many civilian jurisdictions do. The Essay concludes by weighing this procedural innovation
against other possible responses to the moral ambiguity of public prosecution, such as dramatically reducing the severity of state punishment or replacing our existing criminal legal system
with a bifurcated procedure that divides adjudication sharply from sanctioning, restricting moral
blame and accountability to the adjudicatory stage and treating the sanctioning stage as a clinical
exercise in crime reduction. If no such innovation is ultimately feasible and morally attractive,
then the argument of this Essay is perhaps a partial reductio ad absurdum of a system of exclusive
public prosecution in which the criminal process is an institutional analog of interpersonal moral
blame, a demonstration of the moral deﬁciency of a criminal legal system that holds interpersonal wrongdoers morally accountable to the polity rather than to their direct victims.
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introduction
Even the shortest term of incarceration causes hardship and deprivation of
a kind impossible to justify in almost any nonpenal context. Perhaps for this
reason, when we examine the moral foundations of state punishment, we tend
to focus more on the punished than on the punisher—more on what makes
someone liable to sanctions than on what entitles the state to inﬂict them. 1 We
focus still less on what entitles the state to seek them, that is, to serve as criminal prosecutor. Yet the last question is just as important as the others, and it is
just as diﬃcult. For even if we grant that justice permits certain people to be
punished by the state, it remains an open question whether the state, rather
than another party, should enjoy the sole legal right to instigate the process
that decides guilt and innocence.
Because that process involves an element of blaming and holding morally
accountable, the question of what entitles the state to serve as prosecutor is in
part a question about the state’s moral standing to call supposed wrongdoers to
account. An entity has the moral standing to call another to account when it
has a presumptive moral entitlement to accuse the other of wrongdoing and to
demand that the other answer the accusation by admitting or denying responsibility. This presumptive entitlement is not an indefeasible right: an entity
with the standing to call another to account is not justiﬁed in doing so when
the consequences would be very bad. At the same time, an entity need not have
standing to call another to account in order to be justiﬁed in doing so. Although an entity that lacks standing is presumptively disentitled to call another
to account, it may do so anyway if the consequences would be very good or the
consequences of silence very bad. I will argue that this moral predicament is
roughly that of the contemporary state.
In terms of eﬃcacy and fairness, public prosecution is unquestionably superior to private prosecution. Yet the state may lack moral standing to call
criminals to account for their interpersonal wrongs in a setting that excludes
their human victims from formal participation. Classic crimes like the� and assault are in the ﬁrst instance wrongs against individuals, not against the state
or the polity that it represents. But our legal system denies crime victims the

1.

See A. John Simmons, Locke and the Right to Punish, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 311, 311 (1991)
(noting that discussions of the justiﬁcation of punishment tend to approach the issue as being “a question about the kind or amount of punishment that is just in response to various
oﬀenses, or a question about who can be justly punished, or a question about when (if) punishment is the proper response to crime or wrongdoing at all,” rather than as being a question about “[w]hat makes it just for a particular person or group to punish us, instead of
some other person or group”).
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right to initiate or intervene in the criminal process, relegating victims to the
roles of witness or bystander—even as the system treats prosecution as an institutional analog of the interpersonal processes of moral blame and accountability, which give pride of place to those most directly wronged. Public prosecution reigns supreme, with the state claiming primary and exclusive moral
standing to call oﬀenders to account for their interpersonal criminal wrongdoing. Although likely justiﬁed, all things considered, this legal arrangement upends the structures of accountability familiar from ordinary life, where the victims of wrongdoing enjoy moral standing of a caliber greater than that of most
if not all third parties. By inverting these structures of accountability, the state
that acts as exclusive public prosecutor exceeds its moral standing and incurs a
debt to the crime victim, who retains a persisting moral complaint, even
against a state that justiﬁably monopolizes the prosecution function.
The victim’s persisting moral complaint is diﬀerent from (although not entirely unrelated to) the familiar grievance that a criminal legal system that marginalizes or excludes crime victims risks injuring their dignity and impairing
their prospects for vindication and reconciliation. 2 If the state showed crime
victims greater solicitude and accommodated their interests and considered
preferences more deliberately, the criminal process would dignify victims and
enhance their wellbeing. But the state still would exceed its moral standing if it
accommodated the victim as a matter of benevolent grace, rather than in recognition of the victim’s moral prerogative.
The victim’s prerogative to call a wrongdoer to account is a widely acknowledged but little examined aspect of relational morality. I will argue that it
shares a foundation with other more theoretically familiar norms of partiality,
self-preference, and exclusion, all of which reﬂect our status as individual persons, rather than as vectors for the promotion of impartial value. Grounded in
the victim’s status as an individual human person, the victim’s moral prerogative continues to exert normative force even when justiﬁably supplanted by the
considerations of equity and eﬃcacy that favor public prosecution.
Like the victim’s moral prerogative, the question whether the state has exclusive moral standing to call interpersonal criminal wrongdoers to account is a
topic few theorists have acknowledged, let alone sought to address. In the ﬁrst
place, few theorists have devoted sustained attention to the ways our criminal
legal system gives institutional form to the interpersonal processes of blame
and moral accountability. Everyone recognizes the moral character of criminal
punishment—that the state in a criminal case imposes morally condemnatory

2.

See Nils Christie, Conﬂicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1977) (arguing that the
conventional criminal process “steal[s] conﬂicts” from victims).
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sanctions on a defendant it judges guilty of culpable wrongdoing. But only a
few theorists have reﬂected at length on the nature and implications of the
moral character of the criminal process. The most signiﬁcant of these theorists is
R.A. Duﬀ, who has argued compellingly that the judgment of guilt in a criminal case comes only a�er the state has engaged the defendant in what the law
represents (and the participants tend to understand) as a relational moral
transaction. It is a transaction in which the state claims the moral standing to
accuse the defendant of wrongdoing and to demand that the defendant answer
the accusation by admitting or denying moral responsibility. Theorists who pay
little heed to these relational aspects of the criminal process can be expected to
neglect the question why the state has moral standing to bring that process fully under its control—why the state has standing to demand that criminals answer to it for wrongs they have perpetrated on others. If Duﬀ has done more
than other theorists to expound a relational model of the criminal process, 3 it is
no coincidence that Duﬀ also has done more than most other theorists to explain why calling interpersonal wrongdoers to account is properly the business
of the state. 4 Duﬀ nevertheless leaves a critical question unresolved, a question
I will call the problem of criminal standing—namely, whether the state’s moral
standing to call interpersonal criminal wrongdoers to account is truly exclusive. 5

3.

4.

5.

See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, THE REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW 30-36 (2018) [hereina�er DUFF, REALM OF
CRIMINAL LAW]; R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 99-143 (1986) [hereina�er DUFF,
TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS]; 3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL TRIAL 55-161 (Antony Duﬀ, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall & Victor Tadros
eds., 2007).
Why the state has moral standing to call perpetrators of serious interpersonal wrongdoing
to account is a question central to Duﬀ ’s The Realm of Criminal Law, supra note 3, an exhaustive discussion of the problem of criminalization. For other discussions of criminalization that approach the issue by considering what kind of wrongdoing the state has moral
standing to censure or what kind of wrongdoer is appropriately answerable to the state, see
Michelle Madden Dempsey, Public Wrongs and the “Criminal Law’s Business”: When Victims
Won’t Share, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ANTONY
DUFF 254 (Rowan Cru�, Matthew H. Kramer & Mark R. Reiﬀ eds., 2011); James Edwards &
Andrew Simester, What’s Public About Crime?, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (2017); S.E.
Marshall & R.A. Duﬀ, Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs, 11 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 7
(1998); and Gerald J. Postema, Politics Is About Grievance: Feinberg on the Legal Enforcement of
Morals, 11 LEGAL THEORY 293 (2005).
In The Realm of Criminal Law, Duﬀ treats exclusive public prosecution as a necessary concomitant of criminalization. See DUFF, REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 294 (“For
the time being, . . . we can take the public ownership of a case as a hallmark of criminal as
distinct from tort (public as distinct from private) law: we will then see reason to criminalize a type of wrong, rather than making it a matter of tort law, to the extent that we think it
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The immediate task ahead 6 will be to formulate the problem of criminal
standing to a ﬁrst approximation—to elucidate the concept of moral standing
in general, to explain in broad terms why exclusive moral standing to call interpersonal wrongdoers to account may elude the state, and to emphasize how
standing diﬀers from all-things-considered justiﬁcation. From this preliminary
discussion, it will emerge that the problem of criminal standing ﬂows primarily
from two sources: one institutional, the other moral. The institutional source 7
is a legal system built on the relational model of the criminal process, which
gives legal form to the interpersonal processes of blame and accountability. The
moral source 8 is the victim-centered normative structure familiar from everyday life that subordinates the standing of third parties to the standing of victims. The state ﬂouts this structure and frustrates victims’ superordinate moral
standing when it combines a relational model of the criminal process with a
system of exclusive public prosecution. This legal practice leaves the victim
with an unsatisﬁed moral claim.
As we will see, 9 the victim’s unsatisﬁed claim cries out for partial satisfaction, even though the overall balance of reasons weighs decisively against vindicating the claim in full. Although reasons of eﬃcacy and fairness justify the
state in arrogating an exclusive legal right to call interpersonal criminal wrongdoers to account, the countervailing considerations that undergird a victim’s
superordinate moral standing continue to exert normative force even when
overridden. They survive as reasons for us to surrender a degree of procedural
control to crime victims within a system of public prosecution, much the way
many civilian jurisdictions do. Near the end, we will brieﬂy weigh these institutional innovations against several other responses to the moral ambiguity of
public prosecution available to a society committed both to a victim-centered
conception of moral standing and to a criminal process that calls oﬀenders to
account for their interpersonal wrongs. 10 One theoretical possibility is to punish all oﬀenders much less severely than our system currently does, meting out
punishments no harsher than that which a third party like the state has standing to seek. Another theoretical possibility is to replace our existing criminal
legal system with a bifurcated procedure that divides adjudication sharply from

important that the case be owned by the polity in this way—and that the defendant answer
to the polity.”).
6. See infra Part I.
7.
See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
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sanctioning, restricting moral blame and accountability to the adjudicatory
stage and treating the sanctioning stage as a clinical exercise in crime reduction.
The purpose of this Essay is not to set forth a brief for a particular policy,
however. It is to explain a neglected problem about the moral foundations of
prosecution and to identify institutional changes that would solve or mitigate
that problem. If none of these changes is ultimately feasible and morally attractive as an actual policy, then the argument of this Essay is perhaps a partial reductio ad absurdum of a system of exclusive public prosecution built on the relational model of the criminal process, a demonstration of the moral deﬁciency of
a criminal legal system in which prosecution is a means of holding oﬀenders
morally accountable to the polity rather than to their direct victims. Alternatively, the argument of this Essay is perhaps a partial reductio ad absurdum of the
victim-centered normative ideal that drives the problem of criminal standing,
an ideal that subordinates the moral standing of all third parties to that of a
wrongdoer’s direct victim. If this conception of moral standing is unsound—if
a collective third party like a political community enjoys a caliber of moral
standing that rivals or surpasses that of a victim—then the argument of this Essay does not demonstrate the moral deﬁciency of a criminal legal system in
which prosecution is a means of holding oﬀenders morally accountable to the
polity. Instead, it may help demonstrate the moral necessity of the state, the
moral necessity of a norm-bound, formal entity authorized to censure and
sanction serious wrongdoing on behalf of the polity. If a polity enjoys moral
standing par excellence, but no such collective entity can sanction serious
wrongdoing fairly and moderately unless bound by law and formal process,
then true moral accountability may require nothing less than public prosecution.
i. the problem of criminal standing
Although born of law, 11 the term “standing” now ﬁgures prominently in
the language of interpersonal morality. It denotes a kind of positional moral
entitlement—an entitlement to hold certain others morally accountable for

11.

On the uncertain origins of the legal concept of standing, see JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTI55 (1978); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1378 (1988); and Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 69192 (2004).

TY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW
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their apparent wrongdoing. 12 I have standing to call you to account for some
apparently wrongful act if I have the (presumptive but defeasible) right to criticize you for that act and to demand that you answer my criticism with an appropriate response, such as a denial, justiﬁcation, excuse, plea in mitigation,
apology, or plea for mercy. My right to demand an answer is also a normative
power: by exercising the right, I put you under a duty to answer me. 13 Standing is thus the mirror image of interpersonal responsibility: I have standing to
call you to account for a given act if and only if you are responsible to me for
that act, that is, you are duty-bound to answer my demand for an accounting.
Standing is a kind of positional moral entitlement in that it depends on how
and where a blamer stands in relation to the target of moral criticism. We are
said to lack standing to criticize others for their wrongdoing when we are too
far removed from it (their wrongdoing is none of our business), when we are
too close to it (we are complicit), and when we are in a moral position similar
or identical to that of the wrongdoer (our blame is hypocritical). 14 These circumstances undermine our entitlement to criticize not by establishing that the
targets of our criticism are in fact blameless, but by establishing that we ourselves are in a bad position to criticize them. If we criticize them anyway, we
will ordinarily fail to put them under a duty to answer us. Wrongdoers generally are not morally obligated to answer to us (they are not responsible to us) if
we are complicit in their wrongdoing, if we criticize them hypocritically, or if
our criticism is meddlesome or oﬃcious, targeting wrongdoing that is none of
our business or is less properly our business than the business of another.
Wrongdoers whom we criticize without standing are thus entitled to deﬂect
our criticism even if it is sound.
Wrongdoers whom we criticize without standing also may be entitled to
criticize us in return. If you owe me no answer for your supposed wrongdoing,

12.

On the nature of moral standing in general, see James Edwards, Standing to Hold Responsible,
16 J. MORAL PHIL. 437, 437-40 (2019); and Ori J. Herstein, Understanding Standing: Permission to Deﬂect Reasons, 174 PHIL. STUD. 3109, 3110-11 (2017).
13. We should distinguish (i) the responsive duties that spring from my calling you to account
from (ii) the ameliorative duties that spring directly from your wronging me (duties to apologize, repair, compensate). The ameliorative duties arise regardless of whether I have called
you to account, provided you actually wronged me. The responsive duties arise regardless of
whether you actually wronged me, provided I called you to account on reasonable grounds
and had standing to do so.
14. For a general discussion of how meddling, complicity, and hypocrisy can undermine a person’s standing to blame, see D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini, The Nature and Ethics of
Blame, 7 PHIL. COMPASS 197, 203-4 (2012).
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then, all else equal, I will wrong you if I demand one. 15 What’s more, if the
particular reason why I lack standing is that my intervention is meddlesome—if
your wrongdoing is not properly my concern or is more properly the concern
of another—then my intervention will also wrong your victim, whose prerogative to call you to account is supplanted by my meddlesome intervention. Although meddlesomeness is o�en a personal vice 16 (a moral blemish on the
blamer), if it were only a personal vice, meddlesome blame might be morally
undesirable, but it would not be a wrong to the person we blame or to that person’s victim. Undesirable or vicious actions do not necessarily wrong the people
they aﬀect. If I refuse to donate to your museum because I am stingy and
selﬁsh, then I exhibit vice (and do something I shouldn’t do) but I do not
thereby wrong you or your museum. I do not wrong you because you have no
relevant claim on me—no claim to a charitable donation, and no claim that I
exhibit the virtue of generosity. By contrast, you do have a claim that I not
blame you for something that is none of my business. So does your victim, who
may justly complain about my meddlesome interference. 17 Standing is thus a
protected entitlement: your victim’s standing to call you to account is not only a
15.

See Herstein, supra note 12, at 3113 (“[I]ntervening under conditions of meddling, lack of
status or hypocrisy involves some sort of wronging against the intervention’s target. We can
detect this wrongness in the critical reactions of addressees to those who, for example, direct
them hypocritically or oﬃciously. For instance, ‘who the hell are you to demand that of me!’;
‘you stay out of it!’; or ‘mind your own business!’ are responses we tend to bark rather than
say. And we view such reactions as appropriate, even though they involve negative, aggressive and even hurtful emotions and behavior, such as annoyance, criticism, indignation and
anger. Most importantly, we ground the justiﬁcation for such reactions in the intervener’s
meddling, hypocrisy or lack of status.”); Linda Radzik, On Minding Your Own Business:
Diﬀerentiating Accountability Relations Within the Moral Community, 37 SOC. THEORY & PRAC.
574, 575 (2011) (“[People] believe it is wrong to sanction people when it is not one’s place to
do so. A failure to mind one’s own business is something for which one can be held accountable.”).
16. On the vice of nosiness, see Linda Radzik, On the Virtue of Minding Our Own Business, 46 J.
VALUE INQUIRY 173, 173-74 (2012). On the vice of “judgmentalism,” see Caroline J. Simon,
Judgmentalism, 6 FAITH & PHIL. 275, 275 (1989).
17. Similar considerations show that the norm against meddling is not simply a norm of epistemic rationality by another name. Although blaming someone without suﬃcient evidence
can be morally inappropriate, doing so does not necessarily wrong the person blamed. If you
are in fact blameworthy and your wrongdoing is my business, I do not wrong you when I
blame you on a hunch. In any event, if meddlesome blame were objectionable primarily because it tends to lack a suﬃcient evidentiary basis—if the norm against meddling were at
bottom a norm against intervening in aﬀairs about which we lack evidence—the norm
would do two things it does not in fact do: bar us from scrutinizing faults in an intimate
who has successfully concealed them, and permit us to criticize a stranger for a private fault
that she has accidentally exposed to public view. See Garrath Williams, Sharing Responsibility
and Holding Responsible, 30 J. APPLIED PHIL. 351, 354-55 (2013).
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right to accuse you and a power to put you under a duty to respond; it is also a
defeasible right to bar others without standing (or with lesser standing) from
frustrating your exercise of the former right or power.
Complicity, hypocrisy, and meddlesomeness are the most commonly discussed reasons why a blamer’s standing might founder. But there are at least a
few others. I may lack standing to criticize your conduct if I told you beforehand that it wasn’t wrongful or that I wouldn’t blame you for it. I may also lack
standing if my criticism is inconsistent or unfair—if I criticize you for a fault I
overlook in others, for example, or if I criticize you more strongly for that fault
than I criticize others who exhibit the same fault to the same degree. My standing will be particularly in doubt if the reason for my inconsistency is that I am
invidiously discriminating—if I am criticizing you for a fault I ﬁnd objectionable only in people belonging to certain groups, or for a fault I ﬁnd more objectionable in people belonging to those groups than in others. Similar circumstances can undermine a lawsuit. 18 A judge will dismiss a criminal charge if the
prosecutor’s charging decision was invidiously discriminatory 19 or if the government previously assured the defendant that the conduct in question was
lawful. 20 A jury will acquit the defendant if it ﬁnds that the government has
“hypocritically” sought to call her to account for a crime she committed only
because of police “complicity” that rose to the level of entrapment. Comparable
legal defenses apply in the civil arena, where plaintiﬀs guilty of hypocrisy or
complicity lie vulnerable to the doctrines of equitable estoppel 21 and “clean
hands.” 22 Even a virtuous plaintiﬀ will come up short, will fall below the “irre18.

19.
20.

21.

22.

Like other writers, I ﬁnd it illuminating to draw an analogy between the circumstances that
undermine a person’s presumptive moral entitlement to call another to account and the circumstances that ground several legal defenses. The argument that follows does not depend
on the soundness of this analogy. Nor does it depend on the aptness of the term “standing”
as a label for the presumptive moral entitlement or on there being any deeper unity among
the circumstances that can undermine it.
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996).
Many jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code in granting a defense to people who reasonably rely on certain oﬃcial misstatements of the law. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.04(3)(b)(iv) (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see also Jeﬀrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Criminal Law:
Oﬃcial Statement Mistake of Law Defense, 89 A.L.R.4th 1026 (1991) (collecting cases).
The doctrine of equitable estoppel bars your denying a proposition that you previously induced someone else to rely on when such denial would work to the other person’s disadvantage. Koval v. Koval, 576 So. 2d 134, 137 (Miss. 1991).
The doctrine of “clean hands” bars you from obtaining an equitable remedy (such as a court
order commanding someone to vacate your land or to perform the speciﬁc acts described in
a contract) when you are “guilty of willful misconduct in the transaction at issue.” Bailey v.
Bailey, 97-CA-00577-SCT (¶ 6), 724 So. 2d 335, 337 (Miss. 1998) (citing Calcote v. Calcote,
583 So.2d 197, 199-200 (Miss. 1991)).
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ducible constitutional minimum of standing,” if the plaintiﬀ has not suﬀered
an “injury in fact” that is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant,” 23 the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing thus being in eﬀect none of
the plaintiﬀ ’s business.
The last of these doctrines, which lawyers know as Article III standing, is
evidently what brought the term “standing” into common usage. Article III
standing emerged as a discrete legal requirement in the early twentieth century
as progressive judges, intent on protecting agency decisionmaking from judicial interference, sought to block lawsuits ﬁled by plaintiﬀs hostile to administrative regulation. 24 Since then, the doctrine of Article III standing has ﬁgured
far more prominently in public law than in private law. In private law, the question of standing rarely serves as a locus of dispute. That is not because the concept of standing is unimportant to private claims. It is instead because a standing requirement inheres in the very structure of all private causes of action and
is therefore satisﬁed whenever the elements of a cause of action are. 25 From
negligence, to trespass, to breach of contract, private causes of action all require
that the plaintiﬀ have suﬀered an injury or violation of legal rights as a result of
the defendant’s wrongful conduct—wrongful conduct that, by dint of such injury or violation, is appropriately the plaintiﬀ ’s business.
Despite the legal origin of the term, the concept of standing is as much moral as legal, which is why we can deploy the concept not only from within our
legal practices (using the doctrines and defenses I described a moment ago),
but also when evaluating those practices from the outside. When legal theorists
deploy the concept of standing from an external vantage, they tend to inquire
about the legitimacy of our legal practices under conditions of injustice, asking
whether the state lacks moral standing to condemn someone whose criminality
23.

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (ﬁrst quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S.
737, 751 (1984); and then quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41-42
(1976)). The concept of “injury in fact” is open-ended and partly a function of legislative
whim. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (“Congress has the power to deﬁne injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before.” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580)).
24. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1437
(1988).
25. See id. at 1434-35 (“[In] private law, . . . the issues of standing, cause of action, and the merits
are closely intertwined. . . . For all three issues, the question is whether A has violated a duty
it owes to B. C, an aﬀected third party, generally may not bring suit when A injures B—even
if C is materially aﬀected. At private law, there is no need for a distinctive set of principles to
govern standing.” (footnote omitted)); see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (interpreting tort law as presupposing a rule of “substantive standing” according to which “[a] plaintiﬀ cannot win unless the
defendant’s conduct was a wrong relative to her, [that is], unless her right was violated”).
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ﬂows from injustices that the state has created or willfully failed to ameliorate. 26 This question is important and urgent. But it is not the question I pose
in this Essay. My question is more basic: What could give even a perfectly just
state the exclusive moral standing to hold people criminally accountable for
their interpersonal wrongs? How could these wrongs be the business of the
polity and the polity alone, rather than (also) the business of their direct victims?
In morality, a capable and uncompromised human victim typically gets
both the ﬁrst word and the last, enjoying moral standing of a caliber exceeding
that of most if not all third parties. Victims generally have standing to express
the harshest criticism, demand answers with the greatest urgency, and impose
sanctions of the greatest severity—everything from a cold shoulder or a hot rebuke to a public shaming or an excommunication. What’s more, how victims
choose to exercise their powers to blame and forgive tends to determine how
third parties should exercise their own powers. When a victim forgives, third
parties generally should mute their blame; when a victim blames, third parties
generally should withhold their forgiveness. The structures of accountability
we ﬁnd in ordinary life thus exhibit principles of diﬀerential standing: most
third parties lack standing of any kind, a few possess standing of varying degrees of robustness, and the victim stands at the apex. In our criminal legal system, by contrast, a single third party stands alone. The state takes total charge
of the moral transaction with perpetrators of interpersonal wrongs, denying
eﬀective legal standing to all other parties, including the victim. The state
claims the prerogative to hold a wrongdoer criminally accountable regardless of
whether the victim has chosen to condemn the wrong or to forgive it. When
the state goes forward with a prosecution, it holds the wrongdoer accountable
with a robustness that, in ordinary life, is the prerogative only of victims and
their close associates. Criminal prosecution expresses the harshest moral criticism, demands answers with the greatest urgency, and imposes sanctions of the
greatest severity. Judged by conventional moral principles of diﬀerential standing, the practice of exclusive public prosecution comes oﬀ as a kind of meddling—not because interpersonal wrongdoing is altogether no business of the
polity, but because it seems most properly the business of the victim. In a nutshell, that is the problem of criminal standing.

26.
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See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 388 n.4
(1976) (“If . . . society itself were responsible for any deprivations or degradations that the
actor had suﬀered, society might not be entitled to condemn that actor.”). See generally Gary
Watson, A Moral Predicament in the Criminal Law, 58 INQUIRY 168 (2015) (considering
whether the state lacks standing to punish oﬀenders who are “victims of severe social injustice”).

the moral ambiguity of public prosecution

The problem may fade from view if we attend with blinkered eyes to the injuries that interpersonal criminal wrongs inﬂict on the broader community.
Venerable conceptions of crime deem the communal injury paramount. John
Locke called every crime “a trespass against the whole species.” 27 About a century later, William Blackstone classiﬁed crimes as “public wrongs,” 28 where
conduct constitutes a public wrong (as opposed to a “private . . . or civil injur[y]”) if it is a “breach and violation of the public rights and duties, due to
the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity. . . . [T]reason, murder, and robbery are properly ranked among crimes;
since, besides the injury done to individuals, they strike at the very being of society.” 29 In a similar spirit but a more contemporary idiom, Lawrence C. Becker
argues that conduct is properly criminalized if it causes “social volatility” 30;
Robert Nozick, if it arouses general fear. 31 These ideas encourage us to conceive
criminal wrongs as wrongs to the public, wrongs that are criminal because and
to the extent the public is their victim. If crime’s essential feature is that it
wrongs the polity, then the problem of criminal standing is no problem at all.
We may readily agree with Douglas N. Husak that “[the polity’s] authority to
punish [crime] is no more mysterious than the authority of any person or institution to deliberately impose a stigmatizing deprivation on those who commit
wrongs against it.” 32
The diﬃculty is that our criminal legal system does not punish all crimes as
wrongs against the polity. Our system properly treats rape and murder and
other traditional interpersonal crimes not (merely) as wrongs against the polity
but also, primarily, as wrongs against their individual human victims. Conceiving of all crimes as wrongs against the polity thus resolves the problem of criminal standing at a prohibitive cost, a cost that Duﬀ and S.E. Marshall explain in
terms of a “distort[ion] [of] the criminally wrongful character” 33 of traditional
interpersonal crimes. “What makes rape and murder criminal,” Duﬀ and Mar27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 264,
272 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5.
Id.
Lawrence C. Becker, Criminal Attempts and the Theory of the Law of Crimes, 3 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 262, 274 (1974).
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 65-71 (1974).
Douglas N. Husak, Does the State Have a Monopoly to Punish Crime?, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 97, 104 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins eds., 2016).
R.A. Duﬀ & S.E. Marshall, Public and Private Wrongs, in ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL LAW IN HONOUR OF SIR GERALD GORDON 70, 71 (James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick & Lindsay Farmer
eds., 2010).
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shall explain, “is not that the murderer or rapist harms or wrongs the public at
large, but [rather] what he does to his individual victim.” 34 When the polity qua
prosecutor calls murderers and rapists to account, it calls them to account not
as their victim but as a third party. Our criminal legal system thus runs headlong into the problem of criminal standing, the question why exclusive standing to hold interpersonal criminal wrongdoers accountable belongs to a third
party like the state.
We cannot answer this question just by listing the many evident advantages
of a system of exclusive public prosecution. The problem of criminal standing
simply is not a problem of justiﬁcation. We will explore the diﬀerence between
standing and justiﬁcation more fully in Part IV. For now, it is enough to note
the intuitive diﬀerence between judging that given wrongdoing is our business
and judging that we are justiﬁed, all things considered, in calling the wrongdoer to account. If my calling you to account would be hurtful, gratuitous, counterproductive, mean-spirited, demeaning, uncharitable, self-aggrandizing, or
petty, then, in the circumstances, I am unjustiﬁed in criticizing you even if your
wrong is squarely my business. 35 Conversely, if by calling you to account I can
produce a very good result or prevent a very bad one, then I might be justiﬁed
in calling you to account for a wrong that is not properly my business or is
more properly the business of another. What is true of interpersonal blame and
condemnation seems equally true of their institutional analogs—prosecution
and punishment. Even if the state has standing to prosecute and punish you for
a given crime, it might not be justiﬁed in doing so: prosecuting you might cost
too much, do too little good, or intrude too much on important personal interests, such as the interests you and your victim share in achieving reconciliation
without the interference of a depersonalizing bureaucracy. Conversely, if the
state lacks standing to call you to account—if it is presumptively disentitled to
do so because it was an accomplice to your wrong or because your wrong is
more properly the business of its direct victim than of the polity—the state
might be justiﬁed in prosecuting you anyway if by doing so it can produce substantial good or prevent substantial harm.
Whether the state has exclusive standing to call interpersonal wrongdoers
to account is therefore a separate question from whether exclusive public pros34.

Id. (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Margaret Gilbert, Shared Intention and Personal Intentions, 144 PHIL. STUD. 167, 177
(2009) (“[W]ere [someone] so sensitive to criticism that she would suﬀer a grave physical
crisis if rebuked, in most circumstances it would be wrong to rebuke her even if one had the
standing to do so.”); Williams, supra note 17, at 353 (“All sorts of considerations—especially
in a personal relationship—might mean that it would be callous, overbearing or otherwise
inappropriate to exercise my standing to rebuke.”).
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ecution is justiﬁed. Still, we cannot answer these separate questions separately.
We cannot answer them separately because we cannot justify the practice of exclusive public prosecution unless we account for all of its moral shortcomings,
chief among them the possibility that a state that engages in exclusive public
prosecution exceeds its moral standing by supplanting the prerogative of the
victim.
ii. the relational model of the criminal process
The practice of exclusive public prosecution calls the state’s moral standing
into question only in a legal system that exempliﬁes the relational model of the
criminal process, a legal system that treats prosecution as a means of calling
oﬀenders to account for their moral wrongs. A legal system does not exemplify
the relational model just because it criminalizes conduct that is morally wrongful, or just because it imposes punishment that is proportionate to the misconduct’s seriousness, or even because the punishment the system imposes inﬂicts
the amount of suﬀering deserved (assuming any suﬀering is ever deserved). A
system that imposes proportionate and deserved punishment for morally
wrongful conduct might do so through a means that is detached and clinical,
that subjects oﬀenders to moral evaluation but passes judgment on them from
a height. A system that imposes retributive punishment a�er passing judgment
from a clinical height does not exemplify the relational model—and therefore
does not confront the problem of criminal standing—because it does not draw
defendants into a moral transaction of accusation and answer. Our system does
draw defendants into such a transaction, though, and this Part explains how.
The relational character of the Anglo-American system manifests itself both
in the law of liability and in the structure of the trial. The law of liability is
above all the law of what constitutes a crime. In our system, an accusation that
the defendant has committed a crime is neither a neutral description of what
the defendant has allegedly done nor a detached reference to the legal norm
that the defendant has allegedly violated. It is a charge—a demand that purports to burden the defendant with a duty to respond. 36 Defendants must meet
that demand as they would meet a moral one: either by accepting responsibility—by pleading guilty and submitting to a criminal sentence, the formal analogues of apologizing and making amends—or by denying responsibility and
contesting some aspect of the accusation. 37

36.
37.

DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at 116.
Id.; 3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, supra note 3, at 154.
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Besides deﬁning crimes, the law of liability identiﬁes various grounds on
which defendants may contest a criminal charge. Many of them parallel the
ways people may disclaim moral responsibility for an allegedly wrongful act. 38
Moral defenses of practically every sort conjure a legal analog. When accused of
moral wrongdoing, I may deny that I performed the act (alibi, mistaken identity); I may admit that I performed the act but deny that acts of the relevant type
are wrongful (“undisclosed self-dealing doesn’t constitute wire fraud”); or I
may acknowledge that acts of the relevant type are wrongful but insist that my
particular act was justiﬁed (self-defense, defense of others, necessity). If I cannot justify the act, I may deny that I was to blame for it, maintaining that I was
excused (duress, mistake of fact), temporarily not in my right mind (intoxication, automatism, somnambulism), or altogether unﬁt to be blamed for anything (insanity, infancy). If I cannot credibly deny that I was to blame for my
concededly wrongful act, I may turn the accusation against my accusers and
deny that they have any right to call me to account. Perhaps they told me the
act wasn’t wrongful (oﬃcial misstatement of law); they enticed me to perform
the act (entrapment); they’re making an accusation about the distant past
(statute of limitations); they’re accusing me of bad conduct only because of the
group I belong to (selective prosecution); or the conduct for which they’re criticizing me is not properly their business (“I performed the conduct in another
jurisdiction”; “The conduct is constitutionally protected”).
When criminal defendants mount the parenthetically noted legal analogs of
these moral defenses, they mount them in (or in anticipation of) a criminal trial that Anglo-American law structures as a reciprocal moral encounter, rather
than as a morally neutral inquiry designed to “discover the facts about the defendant’s past conduct and present condition which are relevant to determining
her future disposal.” 39 An inquiry with the sole aim of ﬁnding the truth would
not grant defendants an ironclad right to appear in person, to testify if and only
if they wish, to confront and cross-examine their accusers in open court, or to
be tried only when “mentally competent” (i.e., able to understand the proceedings against them and to assist in their defense). An inquiry with the sole aim
of ﬁnding the truth would address such matters on a case-by-case basis, guided
38.

3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, supra note 3, at 154-56; see also R.A. Duﬀ, “I Might Be Guilty, but You
Can’t Try Me”: Estoppel and Other Bars to Trial, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 245, 246-47 (2003) (describing criminal “defenses” and “bars to trial”). But see Malcolm Thorburn, Criminal Law as
Public Law, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 21, 23 (R.A. Duﬀ & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) (“[C]riminal wrongs and justiﬁcations in the common law world do
not even approximately follow the contours of moral wrongdoing and justiﬁcation.”).
39. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at 34-35, 129; 2 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: JUDGMENT AND CALLING TO ACCOUNT 1, 3 (Antony Duﬀ, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall & Victor Tadros eds., 2006).
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only by a concern for whether permitting or requiring the defendant’s intelligent participation in the trial would make an accurate verdict more likely. Anglo-American law does not take a case-by-case approach to any of these matters. It treats the defendant’s intelligent and autonomous participation as an
indispensable component of the trial. A trial may not proceed against a mentally incompetent defendant under any circumstances, 40 and it may proceed without the defendant’s presence or without the defendant’s active and voluntary
participation only when the defendant has waived or forfeited the relevant
rights. 41 These features of the criminal process ﬂow naturally and ineluctably
from a conception of the trial as a site of moral reckoning, 42 in which the accuser communicates blame to and demands an answer from an alleged wrongdoer,
drawing the accused into a moral relationship rather than passing judgment on
the accused from a clinical distance.
To be sure, the participatory and communicative features of the AngloAmerican trial draw ample additional support from values that are nonrelational. 43 For example, permitting defendants to testify and confront their accusers
o�en serves the nonrelational value of accuracy: suspected wrongdoers have

40.

See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been accepted that a person
whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his
defense may not be subjected to a trial.”).
41. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 (explaining when defendants must be present during a federal
criminal proceeding); United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1992) (describing the defendant’s right to testify at trial).
42. See DUFF, REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 117 (“The point [of the right to be heard
at trial] is not simply that a court which refuses to hear the defendant may reach an inaccurate verdict, but that it is refusing to recognize his status as a participant in the trial; it commits the same kind of injustice as one who criticises another for an alleged moral oﬀence but
refuses to listen to his response to that criticism.”); DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra
note 3, at 34 (“[S]omeone who is called to answer to a charge of wrongdoing must be capable of answering to it, or else her trial becomes a travesty. It also matters that the defendant
be present, and answer to the charge: we should not force her to answer, since she should
retain the freedom to express her dissent from the process, by refusing to play any active
part in it; but the trial seeks her participation.” (footnotes omitted)); 3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL,
supra note 3, at 118 (“[I]f we think it important that . . . the accused should have to answer
in person . . . to the charge that he faces; and if . . . this is because what he is charged with is
a wrong for which he must answer to the polity as a whole . . . [then] it must also be important that other members of the polity with a role in the trial—as witnesses, as judges or
as jurors—should face him in person. There would be a clear contradiction in calling on you
to answer in person to us, but refusing to face you ourselves.”).
43. See 3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, supra note 3, at 99-100 (discussing and criticizing nonrelational
rationales for a defendant’s right to testify, decline to testify, mount a defense, and be tried
only if mentally ﬁt).
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strong incentives to subject the charges against them to vigorous factual scrutiny, 44 and they may have unique access to information about the circumstances
surrounding their alleged wrongdoing even if they were not themselves the
perpetrators. Permitting defendants to testify and confront their accusers also
serves the nonrelational values of fairness and dignity. These values favor defendant participation not as aids to the truth-seeking process but as independent moral constraints on it. “[T]here is intrinsic value in the due process right
to be heard,” asserts Laurence H. Tribe, “since it grants to the individuals or
groups against whom government decisions operate the chance to participate
in the processes by which those decisions are made, an opportunity that expresses their dignity as persons.” 45 Proper respect for personal dignity therefore
might require that all high-stakes adjudicative procedures (not just criminal
trials) be participatory and communicative, regardless of whether these relational elements promote truth-seeking, and even if they sometimes frustrate it.
As Tribe suggests, “Both the right to be heard from, and the right to be told
why . . . express the elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is
at least to be consulted about what is done with one.” 46
Not only does Anglo-American procedural law draw support from nonrelational values like fairness, dignity, and accuracy, but the Anglo-American criminal legal system as a whole pursues nonrelational ends like deterrence and incapacitation. These things do not make the system itself nonrelational; nor do
they obviate the problem of criminal standing. Even if a criminal legal system
pursues only nonrelational ends and its procedural law aspires to uphold only
nonrelational values, the system is a relational one as long as criminal prosecution takes the form of a moral transaction in which one party communicates
blame to and demands answers from another. If criminal prosecution takes this
form—if it accuses defendants of moral wrongdoing and demands that they
answer for it—then the system confronts the problem of criminal standing.
The system cannot evade the question of standing by adverting to its deterrent
and incapacitative ends, any more than I can deﬂect the question whether I
have standing to criticize you by asserting that my sole purpose is to inﬂuence
44.

Cf. id. at 99 (“[I]t might be suggested that the defendant's right to defend himself is required because the evidence provided by the prosecution can only be thought convincing if
it can withstand the scrutiny of the defence.”).
45. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502 (1978).
46. Id. at 503. Responding to Tribe, Duﬀ distinguishes a participatory right grounded in dignity
from one grounded in mutual accountability: “[A] defendant’s right to be heard at her trial
is more than the right to have a say in a decision which will have a serious impact on her: it
is the right to respond to charges which are laid against her; and this right is internal to the
idea of a criminal trial as a process which calls a defendant to answer for her actions.” DUFF,
TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at 118.
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your future behavior. No matter which ends people and collective agents pursue, they will confront the question of standing if they pursue their ends by
calling others to account. The question of standing does not cease to apply just
because the entity calling another to account has an ulterior motive.
iii. criminal law as moral inversion
In our criminal legal system, the entity calling another to account is always
the state. It is the state’s role, not the victim’s, to demand an answer from alleged wrongdoers, and it is to the state, not the victim, that alleged wrongdoers
must tender their answer. The state might implore the victim to participate as a
witness, and the victim’s willingness to go along might aﬀect the ultimate decision whether to proceed with a prosecution, but the decision is always the
state’s. The state’s prerogative to serve as moral accuser is all but inalienable in
the criminal arena, 47 and the state’s potency as a litigant surpasses that of any
private plaintiﬀ. It is true that victims of blameworthy tortious wrongdoing
sometimes can obtain punitive damages—extra-compensatory damages awarded in order to punish and deter wrongdoing that is “intentional and deliberate”
and displays “the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” 48 But
an award of punitive damages stings far less than a prison sentence, and, like
all tort remedies, it is available only to victims who have suﬀered some kind of
injury. While punitive damages are available to victims of paradigmatic torts
like assault, battery, and conversion, civil damages of all kinds are oﬀ limits to
victims of deadly serious wrongdoing that causes no injury, such as many cases
of attempted murder. With respect to serious interpersonal wrongdoing, the
law overall subordinates human victims to the state, granting the state the right
to sanction a broader category of interpersonal wrongs and to sanction them
more severely. The resulting legal arrangement inverts the hierarchy between
victims and third parties that characterizes ordinary life—a moral inversion that
this Part displays by delineating the victim-centered conception of diﬀerential
standing embedded in commonsense morality.

47.

American jurisdictions all but completely prohibit private prosecutions. See generally Darryl
K. Brown, Criminal Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight of Decisions Not to Prosecute, 103
MINN. L. REV. 843, 867-73 (2018) (recounting the history of private prosecution in United
States jurisdictions). Certain other Western countries permit private prosecution for minor
oﬀenses. See, e.g., DUFF, REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 25 (discussing France and
Germany).
48. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) (student ed.).
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In ordinary life, the victim of a given wrong typically possesses a caliber of
moral standing more robust than that of any third party. The robustness of a
person’s standing vis-à-vis some wrong is a matter of what the person has
standing to do when calling the wrongdoer to account. Relative to a third party, the victim typically has standing to express harsher moral criticism, demand
answers with greater urgency (i.e., make demands that generate more stringent
responsive duties), and impose interpersonal sanctions of greater severity. Victims also have standing to accept apologies and oﬀer forgiveness, a kind of
standing that third parties possess in diminished form or lack altogether. 49
Most third parties lack the right to do anything but form critical moral judgments and experience feelings of blame and indignation. Although many third
parties may be quick to form a moral judgment, most are rightly slow to express it to a wrongdoer’s face, especially when the wrongdoer and victim are
strangers to the third party. “[W]hen [a] wrongdoer stands directly before
us[,] . . . we are . . . rather circumspect about expressing indignation,” observes
Linda Radzik. 50 “[W]hen our indignation is boiling at the incompetent parent
who spanks her child in the grocery store, we really want to sanction but are
uncertain whether it is permissible . . . . [W]hat is lacking is o�en not courage
but conﬁdence in [our] entitlement to sanction.” 51
All else equal, conﬁdence in our entitlement to intervene as a third party is
weakest when the wrongdoer and victim are strangers to us. It is greater when
we are acquainted with one or both of the parties, and greatest when one or the
other is a close associate. Third parties with a relatively close connection to the
wrongdoer or victim may possess standing not just to criticize the wrongdoer
but to demand an answer—a denial, justiﬁcation, excuse, apology, or the like.
The demand for an answer will saddle a wrongdoer with a responsive duty of
greater or lesser stringency depending not only on the gravity of the wrong but
also on the relative distance of the party issuing the demand. Wrongdoers owe
49.

Theorists disagree about whether a third party ever has standing to forgive the wrong done
to the victim, as opposed to the more or less attenuated wrong done to the third party as a
consequence of the wrong done to the victim (e.g., the distress you caused me when you injured my friend). For a range of views on the possibility and propriety of third-party forgiveness, see MARGARET URBAN WALKER, MORAL REPAIR: RECONSTRUCTING MORAL RELATIONS AFTER WRONGDOING 178-79 (2006); Rosalind Chaplin, Taking It Personally: ThirdParty Forgiveness, Close Relationships, and the Standing to Forgive, in 9 OXFORD STUDIES IN
NORMATIVE ETHICS 73, 81 (Mark Timmons ed., 2019); Alice MacLachlan, In Defense of
Third-Party Forgiveness, in THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF FORGIVENESS 135, 150-51 (Kathryn J.
Norlock ed., 2017); and Jeﬀrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY
& JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 21 (1988).
50. Radzik, supra note 15, at 583.
51. Id.
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more stringent responsive duties to their close associates and to the close associates of their victims than to others. Wrongdoers owe the strongest responsive
duties to their direct victims. Failing to explain yourself to the person you have
wronged is a more serious moral breach than failing to explain yourself to a
third party.
A victim’s standing is not only more robust than that of a typical third party; it is also, and not coincidentally, less contingent. A victim’s standing to hold
a wrongdoer accountable is contingent on little beside the victim’s prior conduct, speciﬁcally, on whether the victim is a hypocrite, was an accomplice to the
wrong being criticized, promised not to criticize it, and so forth. By contrast, a
third party’s standing—or, more exactly, the robustness of a third party’s standing—is contingent not only on the third party’s prior conduct but also on myriad other considerations. As we just saw, one of them is the closeness of the
third party’s connection with the victim or wrongdoer. The remaining considerations are diverse, and they interact in ways that elude neat systematization.
The question whether a third party’s intervention constitutes a form of meddling is diﬃcult not only for theorists but also for potential third-party
blamers. As Radzik notes, when seeking to ascertain whether a stranger’s
wrongdoing “counts as our business,” such that we have standing to call the
wrongdoer to account, “[w]e puzzle over the severity of the wrong, the setting
of the wrong, the intimacy of our relations to victim and wrongdoer, whether
other bystanders are more intimately related to the main parties, how motivated these others are to do the work of sanctioning, [and] how eﬀective their
sanctions are.” 52 Rarely does any such consideration operate categorically. For
the most part, each is only a factor, a consideration tending to push a given
wrong closer to or further away from the domain over which we have jurisdiction as third-party blamers.
One factor of uncertain signiﬁcance is a wrong’s severity. Although we
might not hesitate to call Hitler or bin Laden to account for their atrocities,
many of us might feel out of place taking a complete stranger to task for a
string of armed robberies, serious though that sort of violent wrongdoing is.
Hitler and bin Laden are moral extremes. The exceptional gravity of their
wrongs seems to grant all moral beings standing to hold them accountable, irrespective of other factors. As regards most other wrongs, even many very serious ones, a wrong’s severity alone usually seems insuﬃcient to make it our
business to criticize the wrongdoer to their face. When the wrongdoer and victim are both strangers to us, the wrong’s sheer proximity o�en seems a more
important factor than its severity. We are far likelier to feel entitled to repri-

52.

Id. at 591.
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mand a pickpocket we observe in action than to feel entitled to reprimand
someone who we are told picked a pocket yesterday or last week. A stranger’s
wrong rarely becomes our business just because it is severe. The obverse seems
false, however: if we have a close relationship with the wrongdoer or victim,
that relationship seems to make even minor wrongs our business, granting us
standing to hold our spouses accountable for being rude to a store clerk or to
hold a stranger accountable for scratching our parents’ car.
Another factor bearing on our standing to intervene as a third party is the
moral or psychological status of the victim. When immaturity, incapacity, or
subjugation renders a victim unable to hold a wrongdoer accountable, or when
fear or lack of self-respect renders the victim unwilling, we might feel entitled
to step in and call the wrongdoer to account for a wrong we otherwise would
regard as none of our business. Here and elsewhere, it can be diﬃcult to discern whether our feeling of entitlement stems from a conviction that the wrong
has become our business, thanks to the victim’s inﬁrmity or timidity, or instead
from a sense that the circumstances justify our intervention even though the
wrong is not our business. This distinction will matter in Part IV. At this juncture, it suﬃces to observe that a third party’s standing is rarely, if ever, more
robust than that of a capable victim. Nor is a third party’s standing usually
more robust than that of other capable third parties who are positioned closer
to the victim or wrongdoer. In ordinary life, a given third party’s standing is
thus contingent not only on the status of the victim but on the status of other
third parties.
When we turn to the criminal law, however, we ﬁnd a single third party
with purported moral standing contingent on that of no other party, not even
the victim. The state is by deﬁnition a third party to every interpersonal moral
wrong, as is the polity that the state represents, yet the state’s purported standing to call perpetrators of interpersonal criminal wrongdoing to account is
maximally robust and minimally contingent—the opposite of a third party’s
standing in ordinary life. There, the principal complaint is the victim’s. In law,
the principal complaint is the polity’s. The victim can sue in tort, if at all. In ordinary life, a victim’s forgiveness or acceptance of an apology can transform a
moral relationship, not only between the victim and the wrongdoer but also
between the wrongdoer and third parties. Third parties generally should be
slow to blame wrongdoers whose victims have forgiven them, 53 just as they
should be slow to forgive wrongdoers whose victims have not. 54 In law, by contrast, if the victim chooses forgiveness over blame or accepts the wrongdoer’s

53.
54.

See DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 56 (2012).
See Glen Pettigrove, The Standing to Forgive, 92 MONIST 583, 598 (2009).
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apology, these choices have no formal legal eﬀect on the polity qua accuser.
They are but evidence for the polity to consider or ignore.
The problem is not simply that the polity qua accuser claims moral standing to hold its members accountable for wronging one another. Perhaps any
community has moral standing to subject its members to a measure of thirdparty blame for certain serious interpersonal wrongs. The problem is rather
that, when the polity holds its members accountable through the criminal law,
the moral transaction takes on the character of second-party blame, both in its
harshness and in its primacy. Consider in this connection James Edwards’s observation that a party’s standing to hold another responsible depends not only
on (i) whom it is holding responsible and (ii) what it is holding them responsible for, but also on (iii) how it is holding them responsible—in particular,
how harshly it is censuring and sanctioning them. 55 A third party’s standing to
mount a harsh response is diﬃcult to establish under any circumstances. It is
especially diﬃcult to establish when parties more directly aﬀected by the
wrongdoing have ample capacity to mount a response of their own, as most
crime victims would if aﬀorded proper resources. A third party might have
standing to mount a harsh response when it acts in support of and in solidarity
with a willing victim, or when a victim is coerced into silence or unable to
speak up. In such cases, the third party’s response may properly be in the victim’s name. Yet, in our criminal legal system, the state does not speak in the
name of the victim. It speaks in the name of the public. The state calls oﬀenders to account to it for wrongs they have perpetrated on others, and it does so
harshly and in a manner that altogether displaces those who possess what appears to be a superior claim—those with true second-party standing. Secondparty accountability (accountability demanded by victims) plays no formal role
whatever in the law of crimes, and it plays at best a secondary role in law overall through the law of torts. The resulting arrangement clashes with conventional principles of diﬀerential moral standing, which place victims at the apex.
What kind of arrangement would a state enact if determined to respect
principles of diﬀerential moral standing to the utmost, without regard to
whether the resulting legal arrangement was justiﬁed overall? A state with this

55.

Edwards, supra note 12, at 442; see id. at 444 (“Compare two cases in which students might
hold one another responsible for failing to prepare for class. In the ﬁrst, they do so by refusing to share notes with those who fail to prepare, and who oﬀer no satisfactory explanation
for the failure. In the second they do so by barring those who fail to prepare from the classroom until a satisfactory explanation is forthcoming. It seems clear that there is something
defective about the second holding: students, we might plausibly say, do not have standing
to bar one another from class.”).
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parochial commitment would enact a system of routine private prosecution, 56
based perhaps on the “civil model” of the criminal process described (but not
endorsed) by Marshall and Duﬀ:
A civil model puts the victim in charge. She is the complainant who initiates the proceedings against the person who (allegedly) wronged her;
it is for her to carry the case through, or to drop it. This is not to say
that the community has no role. . . . [I]t provides the institutional
structure through which her case is decided, and the arbitrator or judge
who will assist in resolving the case or produce an authoritative decision, as well as enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the alleged
wrongdoer complies with the decision; it could also provide advice and
resources to assist the complainant in pursuing her case. But she is still
in charge: it is for her to decide whether the case is brought and pursued, and whether the decision is enforced . . . . 57
If a state implemented Marshall and Duﬀ ’s civil model of the criminal process,
it would cast itself in the role of a supporting player. Its chief function in the
criminal arena would be to hear and adjudicate claims brought by victims,
whom it might support by providing pro bono counsel and professional investigators. The state would serve as lead prosecutor only when the defendant’s
misconduct did not (or did not merely) wrong individual human victims, but
instead (or also) wronged the public, the state itself, or no one in particular—a
miscellaneous category of oﬀenses encompassing environmental crimes, possession oﬀenses, reckless driving, and insider trading. 58 Consistent with principles of diﬀerential standing, the state might serve as co-prosecutor in a case
of paradigmatically interpersonal wrongdoing where the crime caused indirect
harm to the larger community 59 or constituted an attack on an individual qua
member of an oppressed group, the equal moral status of which the state might
help to vindicate by exercising its third-party moral standing. 60 As long as the
state played a secondary role in these cases—seizing full control of the criminal
process only if the victim (or victim’s proxy) was unavailable, incapable, com56.

57.
58.
59.
60.

Private prosecution was once routine in common-law jurisdictions but now exists only to a
limited degree in a handful of them and is virtually nonexistent in the United States. See
Brown, supra note 47, at 867-71.
Marshall & Duﬀ, supra note 4, at 15-16.
For a discussion of similar schemes incorporating a civil model of the criminal process
alongside a limited role for public prosecution, see Duﬀ & Marshall, supra note 33, at 80-81.
For an account of these injuries, see sources cited supra notes 30-31.
See Stephanos Bibas, Victims Versus the State’s Monopoly on Punishment?, 130 YALE L.J.F. 852,
862 (2021) (observing that individual acts of sex traﬃcking harm “women in general”).
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promised, coerced, or complacent—then the structure of standing in criminal
law would mirror rather than invert the structure of standing in ordinary life.
iv. public prosecution and moral remainder
Considerations of diﬀerential moral standing evidently favor a civil model
of the criminal process. But other more pressing considerations unquestionably
oppose it. Suppose we actually entrusted prosecutorial control to crime victims.
We would see the criminal process deployed far less o�en against oﬀenders
who prey on the poor, the unsophisticated, the overlenient, the easily intimidated, the readily bought oﬀ, the subjugated, the busy, and the distracted, than
against oﬀenders whose victims are well-resourced, savvy, unforgiving, implacable, or incorruptible—not to mention racist, oppressive, or sadistic. 61 The certain prospect of these inequities constitutes an all-but-decisive case against the
civil model of the criminal process. Yet it does not establish the state’s exclusive
moral standing to call interpersonal wrongdoers to account. Whether the state
has exclusive moral standing to call interpersonal wrongdoers to account is a
separate question from whether the state is morally justiﬁed overall in enacting
a system of exclusive public prosecution. If we conﬂate these questions, we will
obscure the possibility that the overall balance of reasons favors a system of exclusive public prosecution even as that system intrudes on the moral prerogative of crime victims. And if we obscure this possibility, we will obscure a further one, which it is the aim of this Part to defend: that the considerations
undergirding a victim’s moral prerogative may survive in residual form as reasons to enact a criminal process that grants the victim a signiﬁcant formal role.
Let us ﬁrst acknowledge the obvious: a well-run state is a fairer and more
eﬀective prosecutor than any crime victim. This fact does not establish the
state’s exclusive moral standing to serve as criminal accuser, however. For, in
general, the issue of whether an entity has standing to hold another accountable is not a matter of whether the entity can do so fairly or eﬀectively, or can do
so more fairly or more eﬀectively than any other entity can. Imagine a casual
acquaintance who is oversensitive, volatile, and inarticulate, and, as a result,
downright bad at holding his spouse accountable for her occasional thoughtless
remark or selﬁsh decision. Your acquaintance is prone to lash out at his spouse
without good reason and in ways that are pointless and counterproductive.
Although you might be certain that you could hold the spouse accountable for

61.

For a nigh exhaustive list of the practical and principled considerations weighing against
granting victims too inﬂuential a role in the criminal process, see James Edwards, Criminal
Law’s Asymmetry, 9 JURIS. 276, 293-95 (2018).
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her intramarital wrongs far more judiciously and productively than your acquaintance can, that fact hardly makes it your business to intervene. One of
life’s many ironies is that when you stand at some distance from an intimate relationship, that very distance may enable you to oﬀer measured and eﬀective
criticism even as it deprives you of the standing to criticize.
Now, as I acknowledged in Part III, the state’s distance from interpersonal
wrongdoing does not necessarily deprive the state of the standing to call interpersonal wrongdoers to account: certain kinds of serious interpersonal wrongdoing are undoubtedly of proper concern to the community in which they occur. But just as you cannot derive moral standing to hold your acquaintance’s
spouse accountable from your ability to do so more judiciously and productively than your acquaintance can, neither can the state derive exclusive standing to
hold interpersonal wrongdoers accountable from its ability to do so more fairly,
eﬀectively, and eﬃciently than any victim can. The state cannot derive exclusive
standing even from the fact (if it is one) that a just and livable society simply
could not exist without a criminal legal system that grants the state exclusive
legal authority to call interpersonal wrongdoers to account. This fact might
show that the state is justiﬁed in exercising sole legal authority to blame, censure, and demand answers from criminals for their interpersonal wrongs. But it
wouldn’t establish that the state has moral standing to do any of these things,
much less that it has exclusive moral standing to do them. 62 For the state might
be justiﬁed in calling given wrongdoers to account even as it lacks (exclusive)
standing to do so. 63
62.

Edwards and Simester strike me as justifying public prosecution all things considered, rather than establishing the state’s exclusive moral standing to call criminals to account, when
they root the state’s authority to prosecute and punish crime in its superior ability “to get
answers from . . . wrongdoers.” Edwards & Simester, supra note 4, at 132. Likewise Dempsey,
who “delineat[es] the ambit of the ‘criminal law’s business’ in terms of considerations based
on epistemic privilege, eﬃciency, and the criminal law’s displacement function [i.e., its propensity to displace potentially destructive private conﬂicts].” Dempsey, supra note 4, at 267.
Whether an entity is good (or best) at calling a wrongdoer to account is one question;
whether that entity has (exclusive) standing to call the wrongdoer to account is another.
63. Cf. Kyle G. Fritz, Hypocrisy, Inconsistency, and the Moral Standing of the State, 13 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 309, 324-25 (2019) (“Many times (though not always) [various] reasons in favor of
punishing oﬀenders (security, justice for the victims, positive consequences) will be weightier than the state’s lack of standing, and so the state should, all things considered, punish
them.”). Cristina Roadevin argues that there are “clear case[s] of hypocritical blame where
that blame is unfair, but it is nevertheless justiﬁed by its good consequences, which in turn
could not be brought about in any other way. Indeed, if it is the case that the only way to
prevent further wrongdoing is by blaming someone, despite the fact that the blame is unfair,
then it is morally justiﬁed, all things considered.” Cristina Roadevin, Hypocritical Blame,
Fairness, and Standing, 49 METAPHILOSOPHY 137, 140 (2018). Similar reasoning supports the
conclusion that even a wrongdoer’s (or alleged wrongdoer’s) lack of blameworthiness does

1172

the moral ambiguity of public prosecution

The general possibility of justiﬁcation without standing is familiar and intuitive. If you admonish some strangers in the park for cruelly mocking their
clumsy child, a companion might tell you—soundly—“That was none of your
business, but I’m glad you said something: you did the right thing.” 64 You
might wish to respond that it was your business; someone had to say something, and no one else would. As you might insist, the reasons for you to intervene were compelling. And you might be right: by hypothesis, you were justiﬁed. But the question is whether you had standing—whether you were
minding your business or were meddling. One reason why we should not assimilate the issue of meddling into the broader question of justiﬁcation is that
we sometimes might want to say that a person is justiﬁed in meddling. Suppose
that if you did not rebuke the thoughtless spouse for her minor intramarital
wrongs, something very bad would happen: a neighborhood busybody would
spread damaging lies or awkward truths about the couple’s marriage, greatly
embarrassing both of them. Now you very likely would be justiﬁed in calling
the spouse to account for her intramarital wrongs. But it still seems that your
intervention would be a kind of meddling. If you intervened, you would do so
with trepidation and regret and might even feel obliged to apologize to both
parties for butting in. The thoughtless spouse would surely resent your intrusion. Your feckless acquaintance probably would resent it too, feeling as though
you had stepped on his toes. If these feelings are morally appropriate—if you
really should feel regret and an obligation to apologize, and if your acquaintance and his spouse really are entitled (even if not morally required) to resent
your intrusion—then your lack of standing seems to have enduring moral consequences, notwithstanding that the circumstances justiﬁed your intervention.
A justiﬁed intervener’s apparent lack of standing seems to matter not just to
how the intervener and those aﬀected should feel but also to how they should
act. Return to the case of the cruel parents mocking their clumsy child. Even if
you are justiﬁed in intervening, you probably should preface your intervention
by acknowledging (and perhaps even apologizing for) the fact that the matter
really is none of your business. 65 The parents, for their part, may owe you no
not always render blame unjustiﬁed. If you could avert great harm by blaming an innocent
person, then you might be justiﬁed in blaming someone who is blameless.
64. See G.A. COHEN, FINDING ONESELF IN THE OTHER 120 n.9 (2013) (“[I]t is not . . . my view
that it is always bad or wrong for someone who is not in a position to condemn to condemn.
I could agree with a person who said: ‘I really wasn’t in a position to condemn him, but issuing that savage condemnation was the only way to rally others and/or to get him to stop,
and that was more important than making sure that my speech-acts were in accord with my
“standing.”’”).
65. Cf. Herstein, supra note 12, at 3113 (“[W]hen intervening under conditions [in which we
lack standing] we tend to ask for permission, implicitly and even explicitly apologize and
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answer or explanation. They may owe one instead only to their child. I am being somewhat tentative about the exact moral consequences of a “standingless”
intervention because these matters beget controversy and depend on the details
of a case. It is not much easier to generalize about the consequences of a “standingless” intervention than to generalize about the factors determining whether
a person has standing to intervene in the ﬁrst place. The important point—a
point we cannot make if we assimilate the issue of meddling into the broader
question of justiﬁcation—is that a “standingless” intervention generates moral
consequences even when the intervention is justiﬁed.
We can think of these consequences as the moral remainder le� by the
now-breached norm against meddling. Moral remainders arise when the reasons or interests underpinning a breached norm continue to exert moral
force—continue to bear on how the relevant parties should feel and act. 66 A
familiar example of moral remainder is the duty of repair or compensation. If
you carelessly break my arm, your action might disable a part of my body, but
it doesn’t disable or cancel the interests underpinning the norm against injuring me—interests in (at least) dignity, autonomy, bodily integrity, and freedom
from pain. These interests were sources of reasons for you before the breach—
they made it the case that you had a duty not to hurt me—and they continue to
be sources of reasons for you a�erward. It is now impossible for you to act on
these reasons by not injuring me: you cannot go back in time and comply with
your duty of noninjury. But you still can show regard for my interests in dignity, autonomy, bodily integrity, and freedom from pain. You can feel regret or
remorse; you can apologize; you can comfort me; you can pay my medical
bills; you can help me with tasks that I can no longer perform on my own.
These gestures constitute second-best conformity to the reasons that grounded
your now-breached duty of noninjury. All else equal, second-best conformity is
worse than ﬁrst-best conformity. But second-best conformity is still better than
full nonconformity, and, in the circumstances I just described, second-best con-

o�en even directly admit our wrongdoing. We say things such as ‘I know it’s none of my
business, but . . .’; ‘I apologize for speaking out of place, yet . . .’; or ‘I will understand if you
completely ignore what I have to say, however . . .’. These qualiﬁcations appear designed to
preempt criticism and to mitigate or at least acknowledge the wrongness of the intervention.”).
66. My analysis and explanation of the phenomenon of moral remainder owes much to John
Gardner’s theory of “primary” and “secondary” obligations and to his “continuity thesis.” See
John Gardner, What Is Tort Law for? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1,
33-44 (2011).
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formity of one sort or another is morally required. 67 Having failed to achieve
ﬁrst-best conformity, you may not simply shrug your shoulders and walk away.
Crucially, second-best conformity to a given norm might be morally required even when ﬁrst-best conformity is not. Suppose you rush a sick child to
the hospital in my car and damage the suspension system when you make a
fast turn. Your actions are justiﬁed. Does that mean you must do no more than
return my car? No. You should repair the suspension or compensate me for the
damage. These actions constitute second-best conformity to the reasons underlying the norm against damaging my property, reasons rooted in my interest in
controlling and enjoying what is mine. Although you can no longer conform to
these reasons perfectly—and although the emergency relieved you of the obligation to act on these reasons when you could conform perfectly—these reasons
still apply to you now. In residual form, they give you duties of repair and
compensation. Discharging these duties constitutes second-best conformity to
the reasons underlying the norm against damaging my property.
What, then, constitutes second-best conformity to the reasons underlying
the norm against meddling, and, in particular, the reasons underlying the victim’s moral prerogative? The answer depends on a host of factors, including the
nature and gravity of the wrong that we (as meddlers) are condemning, the
maturity and independence of the victim, the nature and intensity of the intervention, and the reason why we are intervening in an aﬀair that is not our
business. But it depends most of all on the nature of the interests underlying
the victim’s moral prerogative, the norm against meddling, and all associated
principles of diﬀerential standing. In approaching this issue, we should avoid
taking a reductionist view that all but equates the reasons underlying the principles of diﬀerential standing with the broader set of reasons determining when
a given act of calling to account is morally justiﬁed all things considered. A reductionist view will struggle to accommodate the sense we sometimes have
that, though a particular act of wrongdoing is properly our concern, we
shouldn’t criticize it all things considered. A reductionist view also will struggle
to accommodate the sense we sometimes (if less o�en) have that, though we
are justiﬁed in intervening in a particular person’s aﬀairs, we incur a moral debt
when we do (a debt evidenced, for example, by an obligation to apologize to
the aﬀected parties)—just as you incur a moral debt when you damage my car,
even though justiﬁably. We can accommodate these moral sentiments more
easily if we regard the principles of diﬀerential standing as resting on a narrow-

67.

On the imperative of second-best conformity to reasons, see Joseph Raz’s discussion of the
“conformity principle.” Joseph Raz, Personal Practical Conﬂicts, in PRACTICAL CONFLICTS:
NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 189 (Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler eds., 2004).
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er foundation, on a particular set of interests that continue to exert moral force
even when the overall balance of reasons justiﬁes acting against them.
I suggest that the most pertinent of these interests, and perhaps also the
most basic, is the interest we all share in having moral signiﬁcance as persons.
Together with associated principles of diﬀerential standing, the victim’s moral
prerogative and the norm against meddling serve our interests in human individuality and importance by elevating above all others a single individual (the
victim) along with a small circle of third parties, and granting these individuals
rights and powers that others either lack outright or possess only in a much
diminished form. Because we are all potential victims, these principles guarantee that we each stand to acquire a unique set of moral powers vis-à-vis those
who may wrong us, including not only the power to call our wrongdoers to account but also the power to demand that third parties refrain from intervening,
at least until we have had our say.
Viewed as enabling conditions of human individuality and importance, the
victim’s moral prerogative and associated norms seem cut from the same cloth
as other agent-centered norms of partiality and exclusion. Just as the norms of
diﬀerential standing give victims and relevant third parties special rights and
permissions, so too do familiar norms of self-preference and partiality permit
and sometimes require us to favor our own good and that of our kith and kin
over the good of others. 68 Like principles of diﬀerential standing, these familiar
norms recognize, honor, and enhance our status as morally signiﬁcant beings
with innate tendencies toward aﬀection, loyalty, love, and self-regard. Absent
norms of self-preference and partiality, we could indulge these human tendencies morally only when, by happenstance, more good would come to the world
if we cared for ourselves and our close associates than if we didn’t. Permissible
forms of self-preference and partiality would be hostage to sheer proximity, our
place in the moral universe as insigniﬁcant as our place in the physical one.
Norms of self-preference and partiality push us back toward the moral center,
permitting us to assess the morality of an action not only from the point of
view of the universe 69 but also from the point of view of (that is, relative to the
perspectives, values, and commitments of) persons, conceived as something

68.

I take no ﬁrm position here on the precise content of these norms, on their comparative
stringency, or on their ultimate foundations.
69. The phrase “the point of view of the universe” owes to the nineteenth-century utilitarian
and radical impartialist Henry Sidgwick, who argued “that each one [of us] is morally
bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own,” because “the good of
any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the
Universe, than the good of any other.” HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 382 (7th
ed. 1907).
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more than vectors for the promotion of impartial value. Principles of diﬀerential standing serve a similar function, marking each of us as a transient center
of the moral universe. Absent these principles, anyone would have standing to
demand an accounting from anyone else for any act of wrongdoing. As potential agents of moral riposte, victims and relevant third parties would be situated
no diﬀerently from people on the other side of the world, except in being better
placed to grab a wrongdoer’s attention. Thanks to principles of diﬀerential
standing, as regards some moral transgression or other, each of us is or will be
the most important being in existence.
This potential status is important in its own right. It becomes important in
a further (but, I suggest, less fundamental) way when others respect our status
by declining to intervene in aﬀairs that are not properly their concern. When
those around us abide by norms of diﬀerential standing, we enjoy distinctively
human beneﬁts—beneﬁts that some theorists have deemed the true moral
foundation of principles of diﬀerential standing. These beneﬁts include the
self-conﬁdence we develop when allowed to experiment and make mistakes
without fear of public reproach, the dignity we gain as victims of wrongdoing
when allowed to hold our wrongdoers responsible without interference, and
the joy and sustenance we derive from interpersonal relationships like friendships and romantic unions, which arguably depend for their very existence on
it being the case that not everything is everyone’s business. 70 Acknowledging
these beneﬁts should not lead us to regard principles of diﬀerential standing as
valuable only in consequentialist terms, however. These principles enhance our
lives through their very existence, whether or not people generally adhere to
them. Merely being in a moral position to hold accountable those who wrong
us (and to disentitle others who would do so without standing) enhances our
moral signiﬁcance as persons, even if circumstances constantly frustrate our
eﬀorts to exercise exclusive moral standing. Likewise, the norms of selfpreference and partiality are boons to human individuality in their own right,
even when circumstances prevent us from asserting our interests or from caring
for our friends and family. The bare permission to harbor special regard for
70.

See Edwards, supra note 12, at 458 (“It is precisely because some things are not everyone’s
business that we can make some things the business of our friends, colleagues, students, and
teammates in particular, and thereby share our lives with them in ways we do not share
them with others. . . . It is no overstatement to say that those relationships could not exist—
at least as we know them—were it not possible to open our lives up to particular people,
while gaining access to theirs . . . . We could not do this if meddlers did not lack standing.”);
Radzik, supra note 15, at 597 (“[T]hree general considerations that can lead to a restriction of
the standing to sanction [are] the importance of liberty in self-regarding behavior, the moral
signiﬁcance of special interpersonal relationships, and the interests victims have in asserting
their own authority.”); id. at 593-97.
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ourselves and those close to us makes us morally signiﬁcant as persons, rather
than merely as vectors of value promotion.
If principles of diﬀerential standing are valuable in the ﬁrst instance as enabling conditions of human individuality and importance, then they are more
signiﬁcant to us as victims than as wrongdoers. As victims, we gain normative
power over all or nearly all other human beings in the universe—power to burden our wrongdoers with a duty to respond to our blame and condemnation,
and power to deprive all or nearly all others of the privilege to chime in. With
respect to the wrong in question, we enjoy a presumptive normative status superior to that of everyone else in existence. As wrongdoers, we gain the right to
deﬂect criticism levelled by all but a small set of appropriately situated parties.
This right is undoubtedly important, but it does not place us at the center of
the moral universe.
When assessed in consequentialist terms, principles of diﬀerential standing
are again more signiﬁcant to us as victims than as wrongdoers. Although general adherence to these principles enables potential victims and potential
wrongdoers alike to enjoy exclusive personal relationships, it grants victims
alone the dignity and sense of importance that ﬂow from holding their wrongdoers responsible without interference or patronizing assistance—a beneﬁt that
victims would not receive to any degree were principles of diﬀerential standing
roundly dishonored. General adherence to these principles confers a corresponding but inferior beneﬁt on wrongdoers, in that it minimizes the number
of people entitled to criticize wrongdoers to their faces and to oblige them to
provide answers. 71 This beneﬁt is inferior not only because wrongdoers are
vulnerable to criticism whether or not others generally adhere to principles of
diﬀerential standing (adherence merely lessens the potential amount of such
criticism), but also because the beneﬁt essentially amounts to less hassle. In all,
if you are a wrongdoer being called to account by a party without standing, you
have less to complain about than your victim does.
You may in fact have very little to complain about at all if your wrong is a
serious interpersonal crime and the party calling you to account is the state. As
the perpetrator of an interpersonal wrong, you cannot complain that no one
71.
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See Edwards, supra note 12, at 457 (“Imagine a world in which all our actions were everyone’s
business. All else being equal, anyone would be able to put us under a duty to justify or excuse pro tanto wrongs—whatever they may be—and to express remorse and/or repent where
we cannot do so. Mere strangers would be able to give us these duties simply by holding us
responsible . . . . It seems clear that in this world, social relations would be far more onerous.
To interact with strangers would be to take an increased risk of having to expose parts of
one’s life one would prefer to remain private, both because one would more o�en be dutybound to explain oneself to others, and because others would more o�en lack a duty not to
demand the explanation.”).
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should have held you responsible. At most, you can complain that you should
have been held responsible by someone else (your victim). And you cannot
complain even of this if your serious interpersonal wrong is properly the business of the political community, as most or all traditional crimes likely are. (I
argued in Part III that the state lacks exclusive moral standing to call interpersonal wrongdoers to account, not that it lacks any standing whatever.) If you
fall back on the complaint that you are being called to account by a party with
subordinate standing, your complaint will come oﬀ as petty if not disingenuous—all the more so if (as we are assuming) your wrong was so serious, and
the surrounding stakes so high, that the state was justiﬁed in calling you to account despite lacking superordinate moral standing.
The complaint that I can lodge against the polity as your victim is more
substantial. My complaint is that the state’s intervention, although justiﬁed,
thrust me from my place at the center of the moral universe and deprived me of
the dignity and sense of importance I would have attained had I been able to
force you to look me in the eye and explain yourself. Unlike your complaint as
a wrongdoer, which seems pettier the graver your wrong, my complaint as a
victim seems the more compelling: the graver your wrong, the more my dignity and sense of importance may suﬀer when a third party silences or upstages
me.
The chief implication is that a system of exclusive public prosecution built
on the relational model may owe little or nothing to interpersonal wrongdoers
while owing a considerable amount to their victims, whose superordinate
standing the state supplants. 72 At the end of Part III, I suggested that a criminal legal system achieves ﬁrst-best conformity to the norm against meddling if it
casts the state as a supporting player. As an example of what ﬁrst-best conformity might look like, I described an augmented version of Marshall and
Duﬀ ’s civil model of the criminal process, in which victims prosecute most cases of interpersonal wrongdoing while the state serves as an occasional coprosecutor, seizing full control only when the victim is unavailable, incapable, compromised, coerced, or complacent. If ﬁrst-best conformity to the norm against
meddling gives victims near-complete control of most criminal prosecutions,
then second-best conformity might give victims partial control of many.
The particular arrangement that qualiﬁes as second best depends on several
factors. The most important is the strength and urgency of the reasons under72.

The state also might owe various procedural concessions when its standing founders because it has failed to ameliorate criminogenic social conditions. But it will owe these concessions to defendants, not to their victims. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION,
AND COMMUNITY 200 (2001); R.A. Duﬀ, Blame, Moral Standing, and the Legitimacy of the
Criminal Trial, 23 RATIO 123, 139-40 (2010).
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lying the principles of diﬀerential standing, reasons that the state contravenes
when it arrogates exclusive authority to hold criminals morally accountable for
their interpersonal wrongs. I argued a moment ago that these reasons are
strong and urgent, grounded as they are in agent-centered structures of partiality and exclusion that (i) by their very existence enhance our moral signiﬁcance
as persons, rather than as fungible vectors of impartial value, and (ii) confer
various consequential beneﬁts when people generally adhere to them. If I have
accorded these reasons more weight than they deserve—if, for example, my
perception of their importance simply reﬂects the individualist culture 73 that
has shaped my moral intuitions—then these reasons may leave (far) less of a
moral remainder when contravened than I have suggested. In that case, the
problem of criminal standing is easily addressed: we may owe the victim whose
standing public prosecution supplants no more than an apology and a show of
regret. The criminal-procedure equivalent of these courtesies might look something like the suite of modest concessions aﬀorded by American statutes like
the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act, which grants victims the right to be informed of hearing dates, to confer with prosecutors, to attend judicial proceedings, and to be “reasonably heard” at proceedings regarding release, plea, sentencing, or parole. 74
If, however, the reasons underlying the principles of diﬀerential standing
are as strong as I have suggested, then the modest courtesies that American law
aﬀords crime victims do not approach second-best conformity to principles of
diﬀerential standing. A criminal legal system infringing these principles
through public prosecution owes victims something more. It owes them procedural concessions that would enable them to participate robustly in the process
of calling their wrongdoers to account, rather than merely looking on or chiming in from the sidelines as the state manages the moral transaction. Such concessions could include any of the following: the right to demand that prosecutors justify their charging decisions; the right to appeal such decisions to the

73.

Cross-cultural psychologists o�en distinguish between collectivist and individualist cultures. See HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM 2 (1995). Collectivist cultures exhibit “a social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who see themselves as
parts of one or more collectives (family, coworkers, tribe, nation); are primarily motivated
by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those collectives; are willing to give priority to the
goals of these collectives over their own personal goals; and emphasize their connectedness
to members of these collectives,” whereas individualist cultures exhibit “a social pattern that
consists of loosely linked individuals who view themselves as independent of collectives; are
primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs, rights, and the contracts they have established with others; give priority to their personal goals over the goals of others; and emphasize rational analyses of the advantages and disadvantages to associating with others.” Id.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2018).
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court and potentially force or veto a prosecution; the right to appeal a ﬁnal verdict; the right to compel certain lines of pretrial investigation; the right to testify at trials; the right to make objections, evidentiary requests, and arguments;
the right to question witnesses; the right to question defendants and defense
attorneys; the right to join criminal prosecutions as civil parties seeking damages or other kinds of nonpenal relief; the right to assist the court in determining the defendant’s sentence; the right to have their lawyers participate in criminal litigation as auxiliary prosecutors; perhaps even the right to have their
lawyers serve as fully ﬂedged private prosecutors, subject to the power of the
public authorities to step in and take over the case where necessary. Many of
these participatory rights are available in civilian jurisdictions; 75 several (including limited access to private prosecution) are available in common-law jurisdictions as well. 76 In the aggregate, these rights and procedures give victims
a substantial measure of control over the criminal process, going well beyond
the “non-dispositive” participatory rights available in the American context. 77
Whether the balance of reasons favors granting victims any or all of these
procedural concessions depends not only on the strength of the residual reasons underlying the principles of diﬀerential standing, but also on the strength
and nature of the reasons that justify the state in transgressing these principles
in the ﬁrst place. I alluded to several of these reasons earlier when I glossed the
serious downside to embracing a civil model of the criminal process—the high
likelihood that the burdens of prosecution and punishment would fall more
heavily on criminals whose victims are well-resourced, savvy, unforgiving, or
implacable, than on those whose victims are poor, unsophisticated, overlenient,
or easily intimidated. These considerations weigh not only against private
prosecution in its pure form but also, if to a lesser degree, against any system of
public prosecution that grants victims signiﬁcant control. In short, these considerations weigh against doing the very things that constitute second-best
conformity to principles of diﬀerential standing. If what makes ﬁrst-best conformity unachievable is that a system of exclusive private prosecution is unacceptably unfair or ineﬀective, then it is almost certainly the case that many partial systems of private prosecution are unacceptably unfair or ineﬀective as well.
The more a suite of procedural concessions accommodates the prerogative of
75.

See generally Johanna Göhler, Victim Rights in Civil Law Jurisdictions, in THE OXFORD HANDCRIMINAL PROCESS 267, 272-80 (Darryl K. Brown, Jenia Turner & Bettina Weisser
eds., 2019); Brown, supra note 47, at 865-67.
76. See Brown, supra note 47, at 865-67.
77. For an overview of how American jurisdictions include victims in the criminal process, see
Michael E. Solimine & Kathryn Elvey, Federalism, Federal Courts, and Victims’ Rights, 64
CATH. U. L. REV. 909, 912-16 (2015).
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crime victims, the closer it will approach the line between systems that achieve
second-best conformity to principles of diﬀerential standing and systems that
are intolerably unfair or ineﬀective. We cannot know the precise location of
that line in a given procedural context without ﬁrst knowing the facts thanks to
which the system threatens to veer into unfairness or ineﬀectiveness. This
means that we cannot say in general which combination of victim-empowering
devices constitutes second-best conformity to principles of diﬀerential moral
standing.
conclusion: ways forward and ways out
Criminal theorists who interrogate the moral standing of the state typically
attend to the urgent but nonfoundational question of whether the state lacks
standing to punish crimes arising from conditions of social and economic injustice. The ensuing discussions tend to assume that, but for the state’s alleged
hypocrisy or complicity, its standing to prosecute and punish crime would be
secure. This widely held assumption has been the chief target of my Essay. I
have argued that the state engages in a kind of meddling when it calls individuals to account for their interpersonal wrongs through a criminal process that
gives institutional form to moral accountability without sharing prosecutorial
control with those most deeply aggrieved by the wrongs being punished. Principles of diﬀerential standing familiar from ordinary life imply that a victim’s
moral standing to call a wrongdoer to account is more robust and less contingent than that of any third party, including the state and the polity it represents. Doubts about the state’s moral standing therefore should arise with particular vehemence with respect to a legal system like our own, which grants
exclusive prosecutorial authority to the state while treating the criminal process
as a way of calling people to account not only for wronging the public but also,
paradigmatically, for wronging one another.
I acknowledge that these doubts might rebound on the ideas from which
they ﬂow. As I said at the outset, we can view the argument of this Essay as a
partial reductio ad absurdum—either of the relational system of exclusive public
prosecution or of the victim-centered conception of diﬀerential standing. If the
latter leads us to doubt the state’s standing to call people to account for paradigmatic crimes, then we might conclude that the error lies not in our embrace
of the relational model but in our ﬁdelity to a conception of standing that places the victim above the community as a whole. For the victim-centered conception might err in excluding the possibility that collective third parties like human communities enjoy moral standing of a robustness and noncontingency
surpassing that of any victim. If this possibility is the way things really are,
what follows? Consider the fact that no human community of the size and po-
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tency of a polity can call individuals to account by informal means without
risking unfairness and persecution. Perhaps any informal attempt by a large
community to hold wrongdoers accountable will devolve into a transaction undertaken by a lone third party or mere aggregate of third parties, rather than
one undertaken by the entity that actually possesses superordinate standing,
the community as a whole. These facts do not yet demonstrate the moral necessity of the state, but they form the beginning of an argument for the moral necessity of a norm-bound system of accusation and answer—assuming of course
that the victim-centered conception of diﬀerential standing is indeed unsound.
If it is not unsound, then the doubts it arouses about the state’s standing to
serve as prosecutor will persist unless we modify some aspect of the criminal
process. Could we allay these doubts without discarding the relational model?
As I argued in Part III, the problem of criminal standing does not arise from
the bare fact that the polity qua accuser claims moral standing to hold its members accountable for their interpersonal wrongs. Rather, the problem arises
from the fact that, when the polity holds its members accountable through our
existing institution of criminal law, the polity’s act takes on the character of a
second-party (victim-driven) moral intervention, both in its harshness and in
its primacy. A response to the problem of criminal standing therefore might
seek to modify one or both of these aspects—the harshness of criminal punishment or the identity of the party that seeks and inﬂicts it.
We have already considered two responses that modify the second aspect,
the primacy of the state. One relatively drastic response is to cast the victim as
lead or sole prosecutor in most or all cases of interpersonal wrongdoing, adopting a civil model of the criminal process akin to an enhanced version of the system of routine private prosecutions that once prevailed throughout the Western world. The civil model would achieve ﬁrst-best conformity to the norm
against meddling, but at the cost of intolerable inequity in the allocation of
criminal punishment. A less morally dangerous approach is to give victims partial control of the criminal process by adopting some or all of the victimempowering procedures I canvassed in Part IV. In theory, the right combination of victim-empowering procedures could avoid inequity while achieving
second-best conformity to principles of diﬀerential standing. If the balance of
reasons weighs decisively against full conformity, then second-best conformity
through partial victim control would be better overall. Whether partial victim
control would be best overall is another question. It depends not just on whether partial victim control is better than more drastic approaches that fully supplant the primacy of the state. It depends also on whether partial victim control
is better than an approach to the problem of criminal standing that targets the
other aspect noted above, the harshness of punishment.
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An approach that targets the harshness of punishment without upsetting
the relational model or the primacy of the state might do one of two things:
punish less, or not punish at all. By “punish less,” I mean reduce the severity of
state punishment for interpersonal wrongdoing to a level where it conveys no
more censure than the polity qua third party has moral standing to express.
Given the communicative meaning of punishment in our culture, this approach
could require us to punish far less harshly. 78 It could in fact require that we
punish many low-level crimes mildly or not at all, leaving us to control these
crimes through noncarceral means if a conviction conveys all the censure that
the polity qua third party has standing to express. The ultimate feasibility of
this approach depends on a question subject to numerous moral and empirical
contingencies—whether the state can sanction mildly enough to avoid conveying more censure than it has standing to express while sanctioning severely
enough to achieve the myriad other goals that the state generally pursues
through punishment. 79
If the state cannot thread this needle, a (still more) hypothetical alternative
is to stop punishing altogether, but to continue holding trials and accepting
guilty pleas, and to subject those thus convicted to a morally neutral regime of
public safety-oriented conﬁnement and supervision. Our existing criminal legal
system blends two very diﬀerent functions: moral accountability and social
control. Suppose we separated these functions by bifurcating adjudication and
78.

Many seem to believe that only a substantial term of incarceration could express the degree
of censure appropriate for the most serious crimes. For my part, I am unconvinced that
physically conﬁning someone for many years is the only way to convey a message that we all
seem able to express just as easily (and, indeed, more articulately) through mere speech. To
say this much is not to advocate an approach to punishment in which “[w]rongdoers who
harm others could suﬀer [nothing more than] a public tongue-lashing.” Bibas, supra note
60, at 861. This consequence follows only if punishments harsher than a tongue-lashing
necessarily convey more censure than the state has standing to express. Whether they do is a
matter of how much censure given punishments convey in a particular cultural context, not
a matter of whether the degree of censure thus conveyed could be expressed through other
means.
79. Bibas objects, id., that the “punish less” approach oﬀends values of equity and proportionality by barring the state from sanctioning interpersonal wrongdoing as harshly relative to its
seriousness as the state sanctions other varieties of wrongdoing relative to their seriousness.
I disagree. The “punish less” approach doesn’t suppose that the only moral constraint on
state punishment is that it may express no more censure than the state has standing to express. The “punish less” approach leaves room for other constraints, such as principles of
proportionality and equity that demand that oﬀenders of equivalent culpability receive
equivalent punishment. In tandem with norms of diﬀerential standing, principles of proportionality and equity might well require that the state punish violations of public order or risk
creation less than fully (where punishing fully means imposing a sanction that conveys the
maximum amount of censure that the state has standing to express).
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disposition, with the further aim of cleaving censure from hard treatment. The
result would be a quasi-criminal legal system in which the state holds oﬀenders
morally accountable through the adjudicatory process alone, sanctioning
oﬀenders through a subsequent procedure that adverts only to nonexpressive
grounds for restricting people’s liberty. Resembling a combination of probation
and civil commitment, this morally neutral dispositional procedure could serve
various nonrelational interests connected to crime control without expressing
moral censure and thus without functioning as the upshot of a calling-toaccount by the state. Of such a dispositional procedure, we might plausibly insist that what is especially harsh is the disposition’s material aspect only, not the
accountability relationship enacted by the adjudicative process that precedes
it—not the accusation of wrongdoing, not the demand for an answer, and not
the censure expressed by a criminal conviction. If the moral transaction between the state and a criminal oﬀender truly ended with the judgment of conviction, criminal accountability would be no harsher than a jury verdict or a
plea of guilty. With respect to its severity, third-party accountability in law
would resemble third-party accountability in life.
As a philosophical ideal, this last approach is in some respects the most attractive: it mitigates the problem of criminal standing by combining moderateness in carceral treatment with bureaucratic rationality and evenhandedness in
the selection and prosecution of cases. As a practical proposal, it is probably the
least promising: it lacks close precedent and requires us to change the social
meaning of incarceration. Yet, for all its grandiose ambition, the last approach
leaves undisturbed our apparent commitment to treating the criminal process
as a way for the state to call people to account for serious interpersonal moral
wrongs. In theory, we could abandon this commitment too: we could give up
altogether on punishing oﬀenders for interpersonal moral wrongs, and punish
them instead only for victimless wrongs or wrongs they commit against the
public. In the extreme, we could give up on punishing oﬀenders for moral
wrongs of any kind, and replace our morally inﬂected criminal legal system
with a regulatory regime that does not portray violations as wrongful. 80 Or we
could leave everything else in place but abandon the idea that the state qua
prosecutor acts on behalf of the polity—the “People”—and work instead to80.

Less extreme departures from our current approach might portray violations as wrongful
while administering a non-relational criminal process—for example, by implementing what
Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard call a “clinical model of ‘responsibility without blame.’” Nicola Lacey & Hanna Pickard, Why Standing to Blame May Be Lost but Authority to Hold Accountable Retained: Criminal Law as a Regulative Public Institution, 104 MONIST 265, 267
(2021). Their model places fundamental importance on rehabilitation, reintegration, and
forgiveness, where “the basic rationale of the system is that of public regulation in the pursuit of distinctive civic goods, including, crucially, harm reduction.” Id. at 271.
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ward a system in which the state acts in the name of the victim. Adherents of
this quasi-Lockean 81 approach would immediately confront the philosophical
challenge of justifying the state’s claim to act in the name of many individuals
who have not consented to the arrangement, a challenge not unlike one that
will be familiar to all who have wrestled with the notion that citizens’ “hypothetical” consent underpins the authority of the state. 82 This considerable philosophical diﬃculty is perhaps secondary to a more practical one: in our actual
system, and in the idealized systems that relational theorists seek to justify, the
state claims prosecutorial and penal authority in the name of the polity. Although individual prosecutors sometimes seek to portray themselves (and the
state) as the victim’s champion, a champion is not an agent or a ﬁduciary—a
party bound by law to act on the victim’s behalf. Our existing legal order conceives the state qua prosecutor as demanding unequivocally that oﬀenders answer to it and it alone for wrongs that they have done to others.
If our current trajectory resembles any of the paths described above, it resembles nothing more closely than an incipient and half-hearted attempt to bifurcate adjudication and disposition, albeit without denuding the latter of its
moral content. The prevailing approach to criminal disposition is to fashion
sentences based on every halfway plausible rationale for the practice of inﬂicting criminal sanctions. Under American federal law, for example, the “[f]actors
to be considered in imposing a sentence” include not only considerations relating to the appropriate degree of moral censure (“the seriousness of the oﬀense,”
its “nature and circumstances,” “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and the need “to provide just punishment”), but also a variety of aims
more or less extrinsic to achieving moral accountability, aims such as “promot[ing] respect for the law; . . . aﬀord[ing] adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct; . . . protect[ing] the public from further crimes of the defendant; . . . [and] provid[ing] restitution to . . . victims.” 83 These considerations
almost inevitably push a sentencing judge toward a penalty diﬀerent from that
which would convey the degree of moral censure that the polity qua third party
has standing to express.
If our existing approach to sanctioning oﬀenders exacerbates the problem
of criminal standing, however, it is not just because sentences are based in part
on considerations extrinsic to condemnation and accountability. It is also be81.

Locke argued that the state’s right to punish criminals derives from our natural right to punish anyone who invades the rights of others, a natural right we transfer to the government
when we leave the state of nature. See LOCKE, supra note 27, at 271-76.
82. On the diﬃculties faced by hypothetical social contract theory, see Ronald Dworkin, The
Original Position, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 500, 519-28 (1973).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018).
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cause terms of incarceration are the output of a single procedure and imposed
ultimately on the basis of a single legal ground: the criminal conviction. Imagine an alternative regime with no sentencing process as such, but instead an independent dispositional mechanism authorized to impose terms of conﬁnement and other forms of supervision based on rigorous proof of their eﬃcacy
in achieving aims other than moral condemnation and accountability. If implemented in good faith, this approach might solve the problem of criminal
standing in the long term, despite the presumably recalcitrant social meaning
of state-imposed conﬁnement and supervision. This approach also might produce terms of conﬁnement more reasonable and more rationally grounded than
the criminal sentences our legal system now routinely imposes. Nonpenal
terms of conﬁnement and supervision would answer to independent standards
and could take no moral cover from the fact of a criminal conviction.
As long as state-imposed conﬁnement and supervision are the upshot of a
process of calling to account, all of us who are committed to the victimcentered conception of moral standing should doubt the state’s purported
standing to serve as exclusive criminal accuser. This doubt should lead us to rethink our legal practices and possibly to change them—to punish less harshly,
to require the state to share prosecutorial authority with crime victims, to work
toward lessening incarceration’s expressive signiﬁcance by cleaving it in whole
or part from the process of adjudication, or to do something more radical still:
to stop treating the criminal process as a means of holding oﬀenders accountable to the polity for interpersonal wrongdoing. If we cannot make these changes, or cannot justify them in light of their practical and moral costs, then perhaps we should view our existing arrangement as a regrettable necessity. What
we should not do is carry on as before, treating the criminal process as a site of
moral reckoning while ignoring the possibility that the state’s sweeping assertion of exclusive moral standing is ultimately unfounded.
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